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Brucellae are class 3 organisms and potential agents
of bioterrorism. Because of effective public health meas-
ures, brucellosis has become a rare disease in industrial-
ized countries, and clinical microbiology laboratories are
frequently unfamiliar with the genus. A low index of suspi-
cion by physicians or failure to notify the laboratory, equiv-
ocal Gram-stain results, misidentification of the organism
by commercial systems, unsafe laboratory practices, and
laboratory accidents have been responsible for numerous
cases of exposure to the organism and laboratory-acquired
disease in recent years. Discovery of a laboratory exposure
to brucellae should prompt an exhaustive investigation of
the event and its circumstances, definition of the population
at risk, enforcement of safe laboratory practices, and
antimicrobial drug prophylaxis for exposed persons.
Inadvertent exposures to brucellae in the clinical laboratory
indicate a widespread lack of preparedness to cope with
eventual biologic threats involving use of the organism.
B
rucellosis is a zoonosis usually transmitted to humans
by contact with infected animals and consumption of
contaminated animal products (1,2). Because of compulso-
ry pasteurization of milk products and strict control of the
disease in dairy cattle, the incidence of brucellosis has
steadily declined in most industrialized countries during
the last 50 years. However, the disease remains among the
most commonly recognized causes of laboratory-transmit-
ted infections; 2% of all brucellosis cases are laboratory-
acquired (1,3–9). 
The Organism
Several biologic characteristics make brucellae easily
transmissible within the close confinement of the clinical
microbiology laboratory, including the facts that the infect-
ing dose for humans is low, and the organism may enter the
body in many ways relevant to laboratory practices (e.g.,
through the respiratory mucosa, conjunctivae, gastroin-
testinal tract, or abraded skin) (1,2). Rare cases of acquisi-
tion of the organism through organ transplantation, sexual
contact, breastfeeding, or the transplacental route have
also been reported (1). Because person-to-person transmis-
sion does not occur, infected persons do not pose a threat
to their surroundings. 
Soon after entry into the body through the skin or
mucous membranes, brucellae are ingested by polymor-
phonuclear and mononuclear phagocytes. The organism is
able to escape phagocytic killing by inhibiting the phago-
some-lysosome fusion and reproducing inside
macrophages (1,10). After a variable incubation period
ranging from <1 week to several months (usually 2–4
weeks), nonspecific systemic symptoms such as fever,
headache, malaise, night sweats, and arthralgia follow,
resembling a flulike disease (1,2). During the early stages
of the disease, patients are frequently bacteremic. This
bacteremia has a continuous pattern, making circulating
brucellae easily detectable by blood culture. Once in the
bloodstream, the organism is seeded to multiple organ sys-
tems and especially to those rich in reticuloendothelial tis-
sue, such as the liver, spleen, and the skeletal and
hematopoietic systems, where it may cause localized dis-
ease such as hepatitis or arthritis (1,2). 
Because of the variable manifestations of human bru-
cellosis, a wide array of different clinical specimens may
contain viable brucellae, including pus, blood, bone mar-
row, synovial fluid and tissues, and more rarely, cere-
brospinal fluid, urine, and genital exudates. The
concentration of Brucella organisms in the blood (11,12)
and synovial fluid (13) of patients with brucellosis is usu-
ally low, and therefore, these clinical specimens probably
pose a low risk for contagion for laboratory personnel.
However, the danger of clinically relevant exposure
increases exponentially after incubation of both solid and
liquid media. Seeded media harbor considerable amounts
of viable Brucella organisms, and routine bacteriologic
procedures such as preparing, centrifuging, and vigorous
agitation (vortexing) of bacterial suspensions, performing
subcultures and biochemical testing, and particularly the
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Most cases of laboratory-acquired brucellosis have
been caused by the more virulent Brucella melitensis
species (3,4,6,8,14–29). B. suis (4,6), B. abortus (3,6,8),
and B. canis (30) have also been implicated, and transmis-
sion of the attenuated B. abortus 19 and B. melitensis Rev-
1 vaccine strains has also been reported (31,32).
Clinical Manifestations of 
Laboratory-acquired Infections
Patients involved in laboratory outbreaks of brucellosis
have shown almost the entire range of clinical manifesta-
tions of the disease, ranging from the common prolonged
febrile syndrome (undulant fever) (14) and a flulike dis-
ease (25,27), to focal signs and symptoms, such as hepati-
tis (17,33), lymphadenopathy (17,25), uveitis (14), breast
abscess (28) epididymitis (29), arthritis (17), discitis
(29,34), pneumonitis (17), deep vein thrombosis (29), and
meningitis (31). Deaths are rare (<5%) even among
untreated patients with brucellosis, but 5 fatal cases
occurred among the 426 persons with laboratory-acquired
disease summarized by Pike in 1978 (5).
Laboratory Exposure to Brucella Organisms 
Because of effective control measures in animals and
animal products, brucellosis has been almost eradicated
from most industrialized countries, where the disease is
usually limited to persons who have traveled to developing
countries or ingested imported contaminated food (14).
Human brucellosis has become so rare in the United States
that <300 cases have been reported annually in the last 4
decades (9,15) and ≈100 per year in the last 10 years (2).
Because of the rare occurrence of brucellosis, technicians
working in industrialized countries have become unfamil-
iar with the staining and other phenotypic characteristics of
the organism. In addition, physicians frequently do not
consider the diagnosis of brucellosis or fail to communi-
cate their suspicion to the clinical microbiology laborato-
ry, which results in inadvertent handling of cultures on an
open bench. 
Although the identification of the genus Brucella is
straightforward (small gram-negative coccobacilli; posi-
tive oxidase, catalase, and urease test results; no sugar fer-
mentation; and requirement of aerobic conditions and
added CO2 for its growth), laboratory-acquired disease has
frequently resulted from misidentification of the organism
(35). In 2 published outbreaks, the Brucella isolate resisted
decoloration and appeared as a gram-positive or gram-
variable coccobacillus and thus was misidentified as
micrococcus or a coryneform bacillus (14,29). In other
cases, B. melitensis organisms tested with the API20NE
(bioMérieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France) identification kit
produced the 1200004 or 1000004 biochemical profile
leading to misidentification of the isolate as Moraxella
phenylpyruvica at a good identification level (90.5%)
(8,18–21). The frequent failure of clinical laboratories to
correctly identify isolates as brucellae is particularly wor-
risome because these organisms are regarded as potential
agents for bioterrorism. Brucellae are inexpensive to pro-
duce and disperse, and transmission to humans may result
in prolonged illness and long-term sequelae. These organ-
isms are considered category B select agents (2). The
occurrence in the last few years of inadvertent exposures to
brucellae in laboratories in industrialized countries
(7,8,14,17–26) indicates a lack of preparedness to deal
with a real biologic threat. Lack of recognition of an iso-
late as a Brucella sp. by a laboratory may enable a bioter-
rorism-related attack to go undetected, whereas a
false-positive identification may cause unnecessary alarm. 
In laboratories serving countries in which human bru-
cellosis is still endemic, the degree of potential exposure to
the organism may be extremely high. In a microbiology
laboratory in Ankara, Turkey, the average annual number
of cultures positive for Brucella spp. reaches 400 (34). A
laboratory serving a brucellosis-endemic area in southern
Israel processes ≈150 per year; at the peak of the Brucella
season (April–June), 10% of all positive blood cultures
grow B. melitensis (27). The risk for exposure in develop-
ing countries is frequently aggravated by lack of safety
equipment and inadequate laboratory facilities (34). In the
aforementioned Turkish laboratory, the disease affected 10
(18%) of 55 laboratory workers, and the calculated hazard
was 8% per employee-year (34). 
Mechanism of Transmission
The probable source of the infection is usually apparent
when disease occurs in laboratories where isolation of bru-
cellae is rare (21). In laboratories serving brucellosis-
endemic areas, the time and circumstances of
contamination are more difficult to trace because of the
existence of multiple potential sources (22,27). Although
the exact form of transmission often remains speculative,
aerosols have been implicated in most cases (24,27,29,32).
This assumption has been strengthened by spread of the
disease to distant areas through common ventilation
(27,32).
Laboratory accidents such as breakage of centrifuge
tubes (7) or blood-culture vials (16) play a minor role in
laboratory-acquired disease and are responsible for only
20% of cases (6). More commonly, exposures are the result
of unsafe laboratory practices, such as sniffing plates
(8,24,26,29,34); working on an open bench with viable
organisms (14,16,17,20,22); not using protective equip-
ment such as gloves, masks, and goggles (34); or ingesting
suspensions of living brucellae during mouth pipetting (3).
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dures is apparent, transmission may occur (17). Rare
events—such as self-inoculation of brucellae by syringes
loaded with a suspension of the organism or with synovial
fluid from an infected patient (3,16), injury to the conjunc-
tiva with a broken tube that had contained a living culture
(3), or participation in a laboratory exercise in which still-
viable organisms were inadvertently used (15)—are also
responsible for a small number of laboratory exposures
and outbreaks of disease. 
Most cases of laboratory-acquired brucellosis have
occurred in clinical laboratories, but transmission of the
disease in research facilities (4,25) and laboratories that
manufactured Brucella vaccines has also been document-
ed (21,22). A laboratory technician at the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) became infected
while working in a safety cabinet with a B. melitensis iso-
late that had originally caused an outbreak of laboratory-
acquired disease in a community hospital (17). In a
separate episode, the organism isolated from a microbiolo-
gy technologist with laboratory-acquired disease infected a
laboratory worker at the hospital to which the technologist
had been admitted (14). 
The attack rate of laboratory-associated infections has
ranged from 30% to 100% depending, among other fac-
tors, on the location of workers, whether aerosol-generat-
ing procedures have been performed, and the
concentration of microorganisms in the contaminated
media (7,8). However, the hazard of transmission is not
limited to persons who worked with the isolate. Among the
74 reported cases of laboratory-acquired brucellosis from
1897 to 1939 reviewed by Meyer and Eddie, the disease
also affected janitors and occasional visitors (3). In a large
outbreak of laboratory-acquired brucellosis, 3 of 7 cases of
disease occurred among persons who briefly visited the
facility but did not enter the room where Brucella cultures
were processed (27). 
Investigating Outbreaks of Brucellosis 
Recognizing sporadic cases and even outbreaks of lab-
oratory-acquired brucellosis is not always easy because the
disease lacks distinctive clinical features (14,17) and has a
widely variable incubation period (7,17,19,32). In a cluster
of disease that originated in a single exposure, the onset of
symptoms of the 7 affected laboratory workers spanned 5
months (17). Although a temporal clustering of cases usu-
ally suggests a large exposure from a pinpoint source
(7,32), this is not always the case. When biotyping was
performed in the isolates recovered within a 5-week peri-
od from 7 infected hospital workers in southern Israel, 3
distinct strains were recognized, demonstrating that the
outbreak was caused by at least 3 separate exposures (27).
Guidelines for Investigating Outbreaks 
In-depth investigation of laboratory-acquired cases of
brucellosis may lead to the identification of unsafe bacte-
riologic practices, suitable for correction by educational
and technical measures. To guide the investigation, the fol-
lowing recommendations are made. 1) Send isolates to a
reference laboratory for confirmation. Organisms should
be shipped as “dangerous goods,” according to the guide-
lines established by the World Health Organization and the
Office of Biosafety at CDC (36). In the United States,
organisms presumptively identified as brucellae should be
sent to CDC or another public health laboratory following
the specific guidelines for transferring “select agents.” 2)
Inform infection control services and public health author-
ities, who may choose to involve CDC. 3) Conduct a
meticulous epidemiologic investigation. 4) Determine the
date and circumstances of the exposure (17). 5) Exclude
other potential sources of transmission, such as previous
laboratory exposures, travels to brucellosis-endemic areas,
consumption of unpasteurized dairy products, and han-
dling of farm or laboratory animals (14,15,17,27,29). 6)
Keep all relevant data and records. 7) Define the exposed
population. 8) Determine the level of risk on the basis of
type of laboratory procedures performed, proximity to the
source, duration of the exposure, and the like, to define
persons to whom postexposure prophylaxis should be
offered (8,32). 9) Check biologic safety cabinets (27,29).
10) Check the ventilation system (27). 11) Collect baseline
serum samples from all known potentially exposed per-
sons (17,27). 12) Freeze isolates for future typing, espe-
cially in brucellosis-endemic areas (23,27).
Prevention of Laboratory-acquired Cases
Brucellae are considered class 3 organisms. CDC has
strongly recommended that live Brucella cultures and sus-
picious organisms be manipulated in a class II biologic
safety cabinet (37). This recommendation, however, is
clearly insufficient for preventing laboratory-acquired dis-
ease because by the time the organism is suspected or con-
firmed as Brucella, exposure of laboratory personnel may
have occurred (27). On the other hand, converting a large
and busy clinical microbiology laboratory into a biosafety
level III facility, where all specimens are handled in biolog-
ic safety cabinets (32), is both impractical and unnecessary,
especially in laboratories in areas where the disease is not
endemic. However, in regions where brucellosis is highly
prevalent, an enhanced safety policy should be adopted. All
blood culture vials detected as positive by the automated
blood culture system, as well as all bone marrow and syn-
ovial fluid specimens, should be manipulated in biologic
safety hoods until the isolated microorganisms are defini-
tively determined to be other than Brucella sp. (27).
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uncommon, the following recommendations are made. 1)
Because of the low incidence of brucellosis, physicians in
areas not endemic for the disease are unfamiliar with the
clinical and epidemiologic features of human brucellosis,
and the possibility of brucellosis is rarely considered in the
differential diagnosis. Periodic education of physicians on
this subject is indicated. 2) Communication between
attending physicians and the laboratory should be
improved. The clinical microbiology laboratory should be
informed in advance when clinical specimens had been
obtained from patients with risk factors for brucellosis,
such as recent history of travel to brucellosis-endemic
areas, consumption of local or imported unpasteurized
dairy products, or professional exposures in veterinarians,
shepherds, slaughterhouse employees, and laboratory
workers. 3) The use of automated, continuous monitoring
blood culture systems for patients with suspected brucel-
losis should be preferred over the lysis-centrifugation
method because the latter involves centrifuging clinical
specimens and visually inspecting plates to detect the
organism and probably increases the risk for transmission
(11,27). Although the use of blood lysis-based methods has
been advocated in the past for improving detection of
Brucella bacteremia, modern automated blood culture sys-
tems are faster and more sensitive (11,12). 4) The familiar-
ity of laboratory technicians with the characteristics of the
organism, as well as with the safe handling of cultures,
should be improved and maintained through periodic edu-
cation. The reader is referred to the excellent review by
Gilligan and York for handling and identifying presump-
tive Brucella organisms (35). 5) Standard precautions and
strict adherence to good laboratory practices must be com-
pletely adopted, reinforced, and regularly monitored. 6)
All work with gram-negative or gram-variable small rods
or coccobacilli isolated from tissues, blood, bone marrow,
bone, or synovial fluid exudates should be carried out in a
biosafety cabinet until Brucella has been ruled out. 7)
Plates should be sealed for safety when not in use and
appropriately disposed and sterilized as soon as they are no
longer being actively used (17). 8) Because brucellae are
relatively slow-growing bacteria, cultures for the organism
have been traditionally kept for several weeks. However,
modern blood culture systems enable brucellae to be
detected within the routine 5-day incubation period insti-
tuted in most clinical laboratories (12). Therefore, safety
precautions should not be limited to organisms that tend to
grow slowly (8,18,20,26). 9) Antimicrobial drug–suscepti-
bility testing of Brucella  organisms is not indicated
because the therapeutic regimen for brucellosis is standard,
and the organism does not usually acquire antimicrobial
resistance. Performance of this and other unnecessary
tests, and especially of laboratory procedures known to
produce aerosols, should be strongly discouraged (27). 10)
If a suspension of living brucellae is spilled and the organ-
ism is recognized, the entire laboratory should be immedi-
ately evacuated, doors should be shut, and an effective
germicide such as 3% phenol or 10% bleach should be
applied by a trained person wearing a safety mask, gog-
gles, an impermeable laboratory gown, and gloves (7). 
Postexposure Prophylaxis 
Because of ethical considerations, the heterogeneous
nature of the events leading to Brucella exposure, difficul-
ties in determining the actual risk for individual workers,
late recognition of outbreaks, and the small number of per-
sons involved in each outbreak, no controlled studies have
been performed to assess the value of administering post-
exposure prophylaxis to persons at risk. However, anec-
dotal evidence suggests that administering prophylactic
antimicrobial drug therapy may reduce the risk of develop-
ing clinical disease (7,8,26).
In a recently reported event, an isolate from a chest wall
exudate culture from an Indian patient, which was origi-
nally identified as M. phenylpyruvica, was correctly recog-
nized as B. melitensis 22 days after the specimen was
obtained (8). By that time, 26 laboratory workers had been
potentially exposed, and 6 had actually manipulated the
organism. These 6 workers were considered to be at high
risk and offered a 3-week prophylactic course of combined
doxycycline-rifampin or trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole
therapy. None of the 5 laboratory technologists who
received postexposure antimicrobial drugs became ill or
developed an antibody response. However, Brucella bac-
teremia developed in the only laboratory worker who
refused therapy, and she seroconverted 10 weeks after the
specimen was received (8). Neither clinical disease nor
seroconversion developed in the remaining 19 laboratory
workers who were only present in the laboratory but were
not in direct contact with the organism (8). 
In another event, 3 laboratory technologists who had
inadvertently worked with a B. melitensis isolate on an
open bench and sniffed the plates were given 1 week of pro-
phylactic doxycycline within 24 hours of the exposure;
none of them became ill or seroconverted (26). In a large
exposure caused by breakage of a tube containing B. abor-
tus, patients who started therapy immediately after serocon-
version was detected and before symptoms developed (10
weeks after the laboratory accident) had a benign clinical
course, suggesting that even if the disease was not prevent-
ed, a certain degree of attenuation probably occurred (7). 
Because of the high attack rate of brucellosis among
exposed workers, the unpredictable and often chronic
course of the disease, and the difficulties in eradicating the
organism once a symptomatic infection has been estab-
lished, postexposure prophylaxis is probably indicated for
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(26). Antimicrobial drug prophylaxis with a combination
of oral doxycycline 100 mg twice a day plus rifampin 600
mg 4 × per day for 3 weeks should be started as soon as the
exposure to confirmed Brucella organisms is recognized
(8). For pregnant women, administration of trimethoprim-
sulfamethoxazole 160/800 mg 2 × per day for 3 weeks has
been advocated (8).
Postexposure Follow-up
Whether exposed persons have received prophylactic
therapy or not, increased surveillance for clinical signs of
disease should be conducted for at least 6 months. In addi-
tion, exposed laboratory workers should be followed for
possible subclinical infections or early signs of disease by
periodic serologic testing. Weekly or semiweekly serolog-
ic surveillance is recommended for the first 3 months and
once a month thereafter for 3 to 9 additional months to
detect late infections resulting from prolonged incubation
(7,8).
Human brucellosis has variable clinical manifestations
and may mimic other infections, particularly influenza, as
well as noninfectious conditions. Therefore, the diagnosis
of the disease requires a high index of suspicion.
Education of exposed personnel on the symptoms of the
disease and the need for periodic and timely serologic fol-
low-up are particularly important. Increased vigilance dur-
ing the flu season employing a broad case definition is
clearly needed, and administration of influenza vaccine
should be strongly recommended to all Brucella-exposed
persons. If symptoms develop, blood cultures and cultures
of other normally sterile body fluids, as clinically indicat-
ed, should be obtained, and a new antibody titer should be
determined. Although use of nucleic acid amplification
methods has been shown to enable early detection of
infected persons (38), these tests are not yet commercially
available. 
Treating Infected Persons and 
Posttreatment Follow-up
Persons in whom culture-confirmed or serologically
proven disease develops should receive therapy with oral
doxycycline and rifampin for 6 weeks, or a combination of
oral doxycycline for 6 weeks and an intramuscular amino-
glycoside (gentamicin or streptomycin) for the first 2
weeks (2,7). Use of 3 drugs is usually reserved for compli-
cated cases or life-threatening clinical manifestations, such
as endocarditis or meningitis (1). Pregnant women should
receive trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole 160/800 mg 2 ×
per day for 6 weeks (1).
Even when patients are appropriately treated, the risk
for relapse remains high (≈20%) (39,40). Therefore,
patients who have completed a full therapeutic antimicro-
bial course should be followed clinically and serologically
for 1 year. Failure to show declining antibody titers may
indicate incomplete cure. If symptoms consistent with bru-
cellosis develop, blood cultures and serologic tests should
be performed to detect relapses of the disease (39). Use of
nucleic acid amplification methods in the future may fur-
ther improve the detection of patients in whom the organ-
ism was not eliminated (40).
Although human brucellosis has been eradicated from
most industrialized countries, isolated cases of disease,
usually related to travel or import of contaminated food
from disease-endemic areas, continue to occur. Because of
the low incidence of disease in industrialized countries,
clinical laboratory technologists have become unfamiliar
with identifying and handling Brucella species. Unsafe
laboratory practices while manipulating Brucella isolates
have resulted in inadvertent exposure to the organism and
many cases of laboratory-acquired disease, indicating lack
of preparedness to cope with bioterrorism threats involv-
ing brucellae. Education of laboratory personnel on the
identification of Brucella  species, adherence to and
enforcement of standard precautions, thorough investiga-
tion of laboratory exposures, administration of prophylac-
tic antimicrobial drug therapy, and close follow-up of
directly exposed persons are strongly recommended.
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